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Abstraction (derived from Latin abstrahere “to strip off, remove forcibly”) is “the process
which allows people to consider what is relevant and to forget a lot of irrelevant details which
would get in the way of what they are trying to do” [Giunchiglia and Walsh, 1992]. Abstraction-
based processes are pervasive in human reasoning. The earliest and most common use of ab-
straction was in problem solving. Abstraction maps a “ground” representation of the problem
onto a new “abstract” representation, which preserves certain desirable properties and is simpler
to handle, since it is built by “throwing away details” of the ground representation [Holte and
Choueiry, 2003].
Management science is concerned with modelling and solving managerial decision problems.
Problems investigated in the literature are generally abstracted from real world cases. This pro-
cess of abstraction is necessarily non-deductive: it is led by inductive and/or abductive reasoning
and cannot represent nor preserve all (potentially infinite) properties of the real problem faced
by a manager [Popper, 1934]. Unfortunately, non-deductive reasoning is often representation
dependent: representing the same situation in two different ways may lead to different answers.
For instance, Ptolemy’s epicyclic solar system was more accurate predicting the positions of
planets than Copernicus’ view, until Kepler introduced the possibility that orbits are ellipses.
Interestingly, the authors in Halpern and Koller [2004] remark that representation independence
is too much to expect if one aims for nontrivial conclusions and that researchers in machine
learning and statistics have long realised that representation bias is an inevitable component of
effective inductive reasoning.
A management science model, like any other scientific model, is essentially a hypothesis.
This perspective finds its origins in the scientific method pioneered by Galileo and Bacon and
reinforced by Karl Popper’s explication of the hypothetico-deductive model [Popper, 1963] in
which the hypothesis is considered to be just “a guess.” As such, one may say that there is no
single “correct” or “true” model. There are instead models that reflect, to a greater or lesser
extent, certain aspects of reality that are of interest to the decision maker.
This perspective on the nature of decision support models is often lost in management science,
because researchers tend to mainly focus on the analytical part of the scientific method, heavily
influenced by the strong tradition of Platonic realism found in mathematics [Tait, 1986], while
disregarding the importance of the inductive and/or abductive aspects of modelling. In short,
classical management science models focus on providing a single optimal or near-optimal solution,
obtained analytically, to an abstracted problem.
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This mechanistic view of decision support, in which to a set of input parameters corresponds
a single optimal choice, instead of generating creative engagement and leaving scope for interro-
gation, mediation and deliberation, simply narrows down decision maker options to a single one.
In reality, decision maker judgment is a subjective matter in which bias introduced by intentions
can be significant [Tawfik, 2004, Tversky and Kahneman, 1974]. This is especially true when it
comes to estimation and assessment of probabilities [Nau, 2001, Sandbu, 2017]. As remarked in
Einhorn and Hogarth [1981], “the conditional nature of optimal models has not been appreciated
and too few researchers have considered their limitations [...] To consider human judgment as
suboptimal without discussion of the limitations of optimal models is naive.” Furthermore, “the
imposition of (subjective) values for resolving conflicts leads to rejecting objective optimality and
replacing it with the criterion of consistency with one’s goals and values.”
The normative nature of mainstream management science models clashes with the subjective
nature of decision making under uncertainty; most management science models do not satisfac-
torily address the problem of reconciling conflicting views and supporting deliberation in the
process of reaching a closure.
In an attempt to begin addressing the above problem, in Rossi et al. [2014] we introduced
“Confidence-based Reasoning” (CBR). CBR is a novel multidisciplinary approach that brings
together statistics, operations research and computer science to support managerial decisions.
This approach uses past (subjective) data to prune decisions that are inconsistent with one’s
goals and/or constraints at prescribed confidence level. For each remaining decision it provides
a confidence interval for the associated payoff. CBR has several analogies with established
techniques in statistics. When a survey is conducted on a sample population — e.g. an electoral
poll — a statistician typically associates a confidence level with the results obtained from the
chosen sample population. For instance, one may claim that with 90% confidence the mean
being estimated is within a given interval. In Rossi et al. [2015] we argue that the very same
approach may be adopted in decision making under uncertainty. More specifically, we suggest
that a decision maker, instead of looking for a single exact or approximate decision, may instead
aim to “estimate” whether a decision is feasible or optimal according to a given confidence
level α and a tolerated estimation error ±ϑ. By choosing given values for α and ϑ the set of
candidate solutions, i.e. feasible or optimal decisions, may vary. For this reason, we introduced
a new notion of solution that is parameterised by these two parameters and that we name (α, ϑ)-
solution [Rossi et al., 2011]. One should note that an approach of this kind to decision making
under uncertainty has been recently advocated by Costantini [2011]. Most importantly, our
approach does not lead to a single optimal or near-optimal solution, but to a set of “candidate”
optimal solutions. Similarly to statements made in the context of statistical inference, rejection
or inclusion of solutions in the candidate set is, by its very nature, provisional. This means it
can be revised when new or updated subjective evidence is taken into account. In turn, this
leaves scope for interrogation, mediation and deliberation among decision makers. In brief, a
CBR model is not a truth-generating machine. It is a tool that can be used to disregard decisions
that, based on available subjective evidence, a decision maker provisionally considers suboptimal
or infeasible according to the chosen confidence level and error tolerance threshold.
Judged rationality seeks a trade-off between the efficiency of means to ends and the “good-
ness” of the goal [Einhorn and Hogarth, 1981]. The former has been historically investigated
by decision scientists, the latter by moral philosophers and theologians. However, in practice
these two aspects are deeply intertwined in the decision making process, since the effectiveness
of decision support may come from structuring tasks so that the nature of one’s goal is clarified.
We believe that the development of decision support tools that leave scope for deliberation, such
as CBR, plays a pivotal role in bridging these two worlds.
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